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Letter dated 21 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith Ukraine's national progress report at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit (see annex I), as well as the Nuclear Security Summit 2016 statement on the threats posed by the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and the nuclear militarization of Crimea to the safety and security of nuclear sites and material of Ukraine (see annex II).*

I would appreciate your assistance in having the present letter and its annexes distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 97, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only.

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Annex I to the letter dated 21 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Ukraine's national progress report

2016 Nuclear Security Summit

Since the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, Ukraine has strengthened nuclear security implementation and built up the global nuclear security architecture by:

Strengthening nuclear and other radioactive material security

As part of the comprehensive action plan on improving physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation, strengthening the security of nuclear and radioactive materials on nuclear and radiation-hazardous objects is a constant process.

Organization and implementation of measures for the physical protection of Ukrainian nuclear power plants is being carried out under real threats caused by Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine and worsening of the sociopolitical situation in the country. Under these conditions, to ensure the stable operation of nuclear power facilities, significant efforts are directed at strengthening physical protection, defence and practical training focused on anti-terrorism and anti-sabotage measures at nuclear power plants. Systematic monitoring of crisis situations and elaboration of new approaches to protect nuclear facilities are under way.

Taking into consideration the unstable military and political situation in the east of Ukraine, in order to prevent provocations, mass disorder, incidents with unpredictable consequences, and illegal actions towards nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation, in January 2014 the State system of physical protection of Ukraine was switched to a high-alert regime.

Acts of inter-agency committees on the protection of nuclear material, facilities, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation have been revised and reapproved by competent authorities of Ukraine. According to their provisions, protection of all nuclear power plants in Ukraine has been significantly reinforced.

New plans of coordination in case of sabotage and correspondent plans of action in case of crisis situation were developed and introduced at all Ukrainian nuclear power plants. All-round automated data control systems of engineering and technical means of physical protection have been placed in operation.

Works to assess the vulnerability of all such Ukrainian plants have already been completed.

Physical protection of Ukraine's nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation is organized according to current legislation in this field. In order to verify its conformity with legislation, in 2014-2015 regular State inspections were carried out at all nuclear power plants, research facilities, radioactive waste management facilities and entities that use category 1 sources of ionizing radiation in their work.

However, owing to State inspectors' inability to safely perform their duties in Crimea and certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in 2014 only three inspections of the systems of physical protection of radioactive waste management facilities were conducted.

Within the framework of the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, in order to enhance the security of sources of ionizing radiation, physical protection systems were examined in 2015 at the following facilities:

- Vinnytsia regional oncology centre
- Zhytomyr regional oncology centre
- Kyiv regional oncology centre
- Chernihiv regional oncology centre
- Cherkasy regional oncology centre
- Kirovohrad regional oncology centre

Systems of physical protection of radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation were installed and put into operation at radioactive waste management facilities.

On 27 August 2015, the "New design basis threat to nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation in Ukraine" was approved by presidential decree.

Project proposals on the modernization of systems of physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear waste management facilities, announced in 2014-2015 during the meetings of the Group of Seven Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, have been incorporated into the integrated nuclear security support national plan of Ukraine for 2016-2018 and the action plan on its implementation, in particular:

- Technical re-equipment of the physical protection system of the perimeter of the south Ukraine nuclear power plant
- Technical re-equipment of the physical protection system of units 1 to 3 of the south Ukraine nuclear power plant
- Technical re-equipment of the physical protection system of the Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant (establishing the main control panel)
- Technical re-equipment of the physical protection system of the personnel and vehicle access control points in the Rivne nuclear power plant
- Technical re-equipment of the physical protection system of unit 3 of the Rivne nuclear power plant
- Construction of an interim storage facility for long-term storage of vitrified high-level radioactive waste returned from the Russian Federation after processing of spent nuclear fuel from Ukrainian nuclear power plants with WWER-440 units
- Establishing a communication subsystem of the physical protection system of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant

- Technical re-equipment of the physical protection system of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant
- Establishing automated complexes of the physical protection system of radioactive waste processing of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant
- Technical re-equipment of the physical protection system of unit 1 of the Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant
- Strengthening the physical protection system of specialized radioactive waste management enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation
- Liquidation of radioactive inheritance of the former Soviet Union at specialized radioactive waste management enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation
- Improving capabilities of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation in ensuring nuclear and radiation safety of spent radiation sources

Currently, after taking into account comments and recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experts, in February 2016 the integrated nuclear security support national plan was approved.

Central long-term storage of spent sources of ionizing radiation is scheduled to be put into service in 2016.

In order to adjust national legislation on physical protection to the IAEA recommendations, in 2016 the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on approval of the order of determination of level of physical defence of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation according to their categories will be revised.

Minimizing nuclear and other radioactive material

There are six repositories of radioactive waste and sources of ionizing radiation, which are kept in storage facilities equipped, in accordance with national legislation, with high-level security systems. However, three of those repositories are currently located on the temporarily occupied territories: two in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and one near the city of Donetsk.

During 2014-2015, competent authorities of Ukraine continued to collect spent sources of ionizing radiation, transferring them to specialized radioactive waste management enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation. Activity in this field has been carried out in close cooperation with the donor States (USA, Great Britain, Germany and France), the European Union, IAEA and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

On 17 June 2015, the implementing agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the NATO Support Agency on the disposal of radioactive waste that accumulated as a result of carrying out military programmes of the former USSR in Ukraine was ratified. According to that agreement, the disposal of nuclear waste repositories is to be conducted at the enterprises of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation with NATO financial assistance.

Countering nuclear smuggling

Ukraine continues to strengthen the radiation control system at its State border. During 2010-2015, within projects of international technical assistance, Ukraine installed and put into operation stationary systems for radiation monitoring in more than 50 border-crossing checkpoints, 7 of which are located in temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Border guard staff participated in more than 100 training sessions on detecting radioactive (nuclear) materials on the State border using nuclear radiation detectors for control and reconnaissance. Five exercises were devoted to response to detection of radioactive (nuclear) material smuggling.

As part of the agreement with IAEA, advanced training on physical protection and accounting of nuclear material was held for officials of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine at the training centre for physical protection, accounting and control of nuclear material.

Regular exchange of information between the border agencies of neighbouring countries is ensured by the border guard executives in order to counter smuggling of nuclear and radioactive materials and respond in a timely manner to the threat of nuclear terrorism.

As part of the "Identifying and stopping nuclear smuggling" international technical assistance project in 2015, five obsolete Russian-made stationary systems for radiation detection were upgraded, two new TSA-type American-made modern stationary systems were put into operation, and TSA stationary equipment was supplied for installation in four border-crossing checkpoints on the Ukrainian-Moldovan border.

The preparatory phase of installing new stationary systems for radiation monitoring in six border-crossing checkpoints on the Ukrainian-Belarusian border is under way. Competent authorities of Ukraine are working actively towards the establishment of an automated system for exchange of information on cases of stationary systems being triggered. Such a system will be a potential platform for an inter-agency information and telecommunication system to register facts of detection and intent of illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials through the territory of Ukraine and across its State border.

The National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine elaborated a draft concept of the State programme of development of nuclear forensics in Ukraine for the years 2014-2020. An agreement was reached to create a regional network of nuclear forensics expertise for the GUAM countries using the funds from European Union technical assistance. Research expert organizations of Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova started working on the project in 2015. Its objective is to create a network of nuclear forensics laboratories in the GUAM region, including the expansion of basic technical and information capabilities of national expert laboratories in each participating country and creating a basis for mutual support and cooperation in this area of research.

Within the framework of the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States and Georgia (TACIS) programme and Instrument for Stability (IfS), the Institute for Nuclear Research of Ukraine received a mobile laboratory for on-site actions in response to illicit trafficking incidents. It also received the

Element 2 precision mass spectrometer with inductively coupled plasma for multi-element analyses at trace levels in nuclear material and environmental samples. Such improvements greatly increased the technical expertise capabilities of the Institute.

Supporting multilateral instruments and cooperating with international organizations

Ukraine continued to fulfil its obligations within the framework of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism according to approved plans, namely, the statement on principles of combating nuclear terrorism and the action plan on improvement of capabilities of States parties to the Initiative to achieve positive results based on multilateral cooperation.

Ukraine confirmed to the IAEA secretariat its readiness to provide interested countries with consulting assistance in the elaboration of laws and regulations on physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear material, radioactive waste and other sources of ionizing radiation and to organize experts training in this field.

Partnering with external stakeholders

With the financial support of the US Government and in cooperation with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Ukraine is working on the creation of a scientific and methodological basis for determining attributes of uranium-bearing materials of different origin and the development of nuclear forensics library data and materials to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and validity of conclusions of nuclear forensic expertise.

Within the framework of the agreement on nuclear safety and respective memorandum of understanding, Ukraine, jointly with the United States, designed and completed construction of the neutron source based on subcritical assembly driven by linear electron accelerator (neutron source facility). Currently, pre-commissioning works and individual and complex tests are under way at the facility.

Since 2014 the following joint projects aimed at strengthening capabilities in the area of detection of nuclear and radioactive materials have been carried out:

- Detecting and countering nuclear smuggling (US Department of Energy)
- Weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation initiative: assistance to the State Border Service of Ukraine (Defense Threat Reduction Agency, USA)
- Technical assistance to strengthen Ukraine's export control system and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (US State Department)
- Increasing the capabilities of the border guard services of Ukraine and Moldova to detect chemical, biological, nuclear and radioactive materials (European Commission)

Following the agreement of the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, the trilateral Swedish-Norwegian-Ukrainian initiative was successfully established. In 2014-2015 seven projects were implemented within the initiative, namely:

(a) *Safety requirements for new types of nuclear fuel*. Project support was provided to the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine to develop requirements for safe implementation of new types of nuclear fuel. These requirements were included in regulations related to safe management of fuel. The project was successfully completed in November 2015. The regulations are currently under consideration by the Ukrainian authorities;

(b) *Tools for probability safety assessment*. Online surveillance systems that enable assessment of safety risks related to the operation of nuclear power plants are being introduced in Ukraine in the framework of this project. Safety assessment software was delivered to the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine and the south Ukraine nuclear power plant, followed by personnel training. Such systems will be installed at other Ukrainian nuclear power plants, as appropriate;

(c) *Safety enhancements at the Rivne nuclear power plant*. Modernization of safety systems of the Rivne nuclear power plant is an element of a package programme on safety enhancement of all nuclear power plant units of Ukraine. Realization of this project will enable detection of nuclear power plant malfunctions at an early stage and timely actions to prevent accidents;

(d) *Safety requirements for damaged nuclear fuel*. The primary objective is to develop regulatory requirements for management of damaged nuclear fuel. The project is in the development phase, with the implementation date set for 2016;

(e) *Modernization of the radioactive source register*. Upon review of the national source register of Ukraine, it was determined that the system required upgrades to meet current regulations and to further improve control of radioactive sources. Assistance in upgrading the system was provided to the authorities that maintain and support the existing national source register. Further development of the database will include applying a web-based system;

(f) *Security upgrades at the Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant*. The project's main goal is to strengthen and upgrade the physical protection system of the Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant. Foreign experts visited the nuclear power plant to assess the volume and value of necessary works. The implementation of the project will begin in 2016;

(g) The thirteenth Ukrainian conference on nuclear security will be organized at the Khmelnytsky nuclear power plant in October 2016. All national stakeholders responsible for nuclear and radiological security will participate in the event to share their experience and expertise.

Issues of concern

Russian military aggression in eastern Ukraine and its illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea posed new threats to the national system of nuclear and radiation security and resulted in loss of regulatory control in those areas.

The following sources and facilities remain without regulatory control in eastern Ukraine:

- 1,200 radionuclide sources of ionizing radiation (category 1-5)

- 65 entities that use sources of ionizing radiation (including 8 that have high-level radiation sources of category 1 with activity of more than 1,000 Ci)
- Donetsk specialized radioactive waste management enterprise of the UkrDO Radon State Corporation
- One repository of radioactive waste and sources of ionizing radiation near the Donetsk chemical plant
- Radiation sources in two coal mining facilities of Donbas, which combine 15 coal mines (142 radiation sources, with the maximum activity of a single source of 2.35×1,011 Bq)

The following sources and facilities are located on the territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol:

- Research reactor of the Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Energy and Industry: DR-100 research reactor, DR-100 (critical assembly) physical test bench, subcritical uranium water assembly, about 3,488 kg of depleted uranium
- 277 radionuclide sources of ionizing radiation
- 53 entities that use radionuclide sources of ionizing radiation, 6 of which use category 1 and 2 radiation sources according to the level of potential hazard (medicine, shipbuilding) in which over 1,200 kg of depleted uranium is used as biological shielding
- Two nuclear waste repositories

Owing to external aggression, Ukraine lost regulatory control on the territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, as well as communication with the Crimean State Inspectorate. Property of the Crimean State Inspectorate was seized by illegal authorities and handed over to the so-called Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea — a regional branch of the Industrial and Nuclear Supervision Service of Russia (Rostekhnadzor).

Companies on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea lost the possibility of transferring radioactive waste (spent sources of ionizing radiation) for storage to the Odessa State Specialized Interregional Plant.

At present Ukraine cannot guarantee physical protection of the above-mentioned research reactor, nuclear material and sources of ionizing radiation on the territory of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol and certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Given the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by the Russian Federation and ongoing anti-terrorist operation in south-eastern Ukraine, any damage to radiation-hazardous objects located on those territories may lead to dire consequences not only for Ukraine but also for many European nations. Thus, we consider that the issue of establishing international control over nuclear facilities that can be seized or damaged as a result of military actions requires immediate international attention.

Annex II to the letter dated 21 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Nuclear Security Summit 2016 statement on the threats posed by aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and nuclear militarization of Crimea to the safety and security of nuclear sites and material of Ukraine

Ukraine confirms its firm adherence to the Nuclear Security Summit community goals and principles. We remain fully committed to implementing further joint efforts to promote a stable and strong international nuclear security system.

Ukraine, which abandoned its nuclear arsenal in 1994, has been always devoted to finding peaceful solutions to the existing security threats and challenges supporting the international efforts aimed at achieving the universal disarmament goals.

In 2010, at the first Nuclear Security Summit, Ukraine took another cornerstone decision — to remove its stocks of highly enriched uranium — and, responsibly and in a timely manner, implemented its obligations by the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. In this regard, we are grateful to our US partners who fully supported us in this endeavour and provided the relevant technical assistance. We also highly appreciate the assistance of the United States in the completion of the construction of the neutron facility in Ukraine.

During the 2014 Hague Nuclear Security Summit, we appealed to the Nuclear Security Summit community to apply pressure on the Russian Federation (then a member of this forum) and persuade it to withdraw its armed forces from the territory of Ukraine, namely the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. We were insisting that Russia's behaviour constituted a real threat to nuclear security, particularly to the Ukrainian research nuclear facilities in Crimea.

Unfortunately, the Russian Federation not only did not stop its illegal actions in Crimea but also moved further by sending its troops to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and fuelling terrorist actions against Ukraine.

Undermining the United Nations-based security system by violating the Charter of the United Nations and provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, breaching the IAEA safeguards' application regime, providing shelter to criminals wanted by the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) and supporting terrorists, the Russian Federation eventually took a logical decision to leave the Nuclear Security Summit process.

This fact is real evidence that the Nuclear Security Summit goals and principles to be implemented in the framework of the United Nations, IAEA, the Global Partnership, INTERPOL and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, as well as commitments taken by all of us in 2010, 2012 and 2014, are not recognized by the Russian Federation any more.

On this background the Russian Federation is declaring its right to deploy nuclear weapons on the Ukrainian territory, namely in Crimea. Russian occupants

are thoroughly restoring Soviet-era nuclear storage facilities and have already deployed at the occupied territories of Ukraine the means of nuclear weapons delivery, such as warships and combat aircraft. To facilitate this activity, Russia is likely to install uranium enrichment facilities, organize production of dual-use materials and apply technologies linked to nuclear weapons on the peninsula.

The occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and ongoing Russian aggression in the east of Ukraine have left the Ukrainian national regulator low-enriched uranium (LEU) research reactor in Sevastopol, two nuclear repositories and more than 1,200 radionuclide sources in Crimea without due control, as well as 277 sites in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including 65 and 53 sites, respectively, using the sources of ionizing radiation.

In such circumstances we cannot exclude the illicit trafficking and malicious use of these sources and could even tackle the threats posed by eventual smuggling of highly enriched uranium to and from the occupied Ukraine's Crimea.

For example, in July 2015 the Security Service of Ukraine discovered that Luhansk-based terrorists sold a number of sources of ionizing radiation from the occupied coal mine in the Luhansk region, which was lately found in the populated area in the Donetsk region.

As a result of the Russian aggression, Ukraine cannot resume control over more than 400 km of its border. These sections of the border can be used by traffickers to illegally transfer to Ukraine and further in Europe radiation sources from Russia. The recent reports of the Ukrainian law enforcement agencies demonstrate that this is a real scenario. Just recently, in March 2016, the Security Service of Ukraine intercepted in the Zaporizhia region three sources of ionized radiation, which, allegedly, arrived in Ukraine through the uncontrolled sections of the Ukraine-Russia border.

In this regard, we underscore the need for continued efforts by the Nuclear Security Summit participating States to strengthen nuclear security to prevent terrorists, criminals and all other illegal armed groups from acquiring nuclear and other radioactive material, especially when such material is placed at risk by conflict or unrest.

We count on the firm support of the international community in ensuring the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, with a view to stopping nuclear proliferation and mitigating threats emerging from the Russian aggression.

Ukraine welcomes the unequivocal decision of IAEA to apply safeguards to all nuclear sites and material on the whole territory of Ukraine, including those located on the occupied territories, in conformity with international law and relevant agreements between Ukraine and the Agency.

Ukraine fully supports the action plans for the United Nations, IAEA, INTERPOL, the Global Partnership and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism aimed at the advancement of the principles and goals of nuclear security summits beyond 2016. The guidelines for the States and international organizations embedded in these documents should mitigate the consequences and roots of weakened nuclear safety and security architecture in the conflict areas.

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Agenda item 44
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 21 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I enclose herewith two separate annexes recording the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships during the month of March 2016 (see annex II). It should also be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the illegal airport of Tympou.

Furthermore, I wish to inform you that Turkey and the occupation regime illegally issued two notices to airmen on 17 March.

The actions of Turkey are clearly aimed at undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, bolstering the continuing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status, by claiming purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. Additionally, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) via radio calls. Meanwhile, Nicosia FIR infringements and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus continue unabated. Turkey's policy of persistently breaching international law and defying international rules and regulations puts the safety of international civil aviation at risk, has a negative impact on the stability of the region and causes difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest against the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation. The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for adherence to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nicholas Emiliou

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Annex I to the letter dated 21 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Airborne violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 March	1233-1353	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC).
2 March	1300-1456	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1417-1550	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
3 March	1518-1710	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1524-1641	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1858-1921	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
4 March	0925-1050	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	1817-1836	One Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
6 March	0832-0907	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
7 March	1454-1555	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1510-1619	Two Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1707-1743	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
9 March	1520-1650	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
10 March	0055-0119	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0825-0908	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
11 March	0656-0715	One PA-46 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	0656-0715	One "Huey" Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	0751-0914	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1045-1202	Two "Huey" Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	2322-2355	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
13 March	2239-2318	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
15 March	1146-1332	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1536-1555	Eight F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
17 March	1021-1133	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
20 March	0939-0953	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1004-1023	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1124-1141	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1144-1157	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
23 March	1006-1205	Two Cougar Turkish military helicopters infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
24 March	1133-1257	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
25 March	0945-1142	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1430-1511	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
29 March	1042-1230	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
30 March	0923-1332	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
	1347-1502	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.
31 March	1053-1230	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC.

Annex II to the letter dated 21 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

Dates	*Nature of violation*
19 February	One A-573 Turkish tanker violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation by the occupation forces.
24 February-11 March	One P-330 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
11 February-3 March	One P-330 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
11-12 March	One P-330 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
14-16 March	One P-330 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
10 March	One P-331 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
12-16 March	One P-331 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
3-4 March	One P-334 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
5-7 March	One P-334 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.

Dates	*Nature of violation*
1-6 March	One P-333 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
7-8 March	One P-333 Turkish missile boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces.
8 March	One A-1600 Turkish vehicle carrier boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
10-11 March	One A-1600 Turkish vehicle carrier boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
17 March	One A-1600 Turkish vehicle carrier boat violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta.
28 February-2 March	One S-353 Turkish submarine violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Keryneia.

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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda items 35, 40 and 72

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Promotion and protection of human rights

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 21 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan dated 21 April 2016 regarding Armenia's further violation of international humanitarian and human rights law against the civilian population and civilian facilities of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Updated information on the consequences of the attacks launched by the armed forces of Armenia since 2 April 2016 is also attached.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35, 40 and 72, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar Aliyev
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-06682 (E) 280416

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Annex to the letter dated 21 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The ongoing armed conflict in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan has resulted in the occupation of almost one fifth of the territory of Azerbaijan and has made approximately one out of every nine persons in the country an internally displaced person or a refugee. The Republic of Armenia bears the responsibility for unleashing the war and using force against Azerbaijan, occupying its territories, carrying out ethnic cleansing on a massive scale and committing other serious crimes during the conflict.

The international community has consistently deplored, in the strongest terms, the use of military force against Azerbaijan and the resulting occupation of its territories. In 1993, the Security Council adopted resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993), condemning the use of force against Azerbaijan and the occupation of its territories and reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the inviolability of its internationally recognized borders. In those resolutions, the Security Council reaffirmed that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is part of Azerbaijan and called for immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan. Other international organizations have adopted a similar position.

In total disregard of the position of the international community and in flagrant violation of international law, Armenia continues to undertake efforts aimed at further consolidating the current status quo of the occupation, strengthening its military build-up in the seized territories, changing their demographic, cultural and physical character and preventing the hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijani forcibly displaced persons from returning to their homes and properties in those areas.

Moreover, regular ceasefire violations, attacks on the towns and villages in Azerbaijan situated along the line of contact of the armed forces of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the border between the two States have become more frequent and violent in recent times, resulting in the killing and injuring of Azerbaijani civilians. The Republic of Azerbaijan has repeatedly brought its strong protests and serious concerns in that regard to the attention of the international community and has made it clear on numerous occasions that the unlawful presence of the armed forces of Armenia in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan is the main cause of tensions and incidents in the conflict zone and the major impediment to the political settlement of the conflict. The Republic of Azerbaijan has also repeatedly stated that the military occupation of its territories does not represent a solution and will never produce a political outcome desired by Armenia.

Beginning in the early morning of 2 April 2016, the armed forces of Armenia increased fighting from their positions in the occupied territories, subjecting the armed forces of Azerbaijan along the line of contact and the adjacent densely populated areas under the control of Azerbaijan to intensive fire with heavy artillery and large-calibre weapons. As a result of Armenia's attacks and subsequent hostilities, 34 towns and villages along the line of contact were shelled and a number of Azerbaijani civilians, including children, were killed or wounded. Substantial damages were inflicted upon private and public property: 353 civilian buildings, among them 314 residential houses, 3 schools, 3 kindergartens, 1 cultural centre and other civilian property were either destroyed or damaged. Furthermore,

357 electricity poles, 3 power substations, 30 transformers, as well as water reservoirs, gas pipelines, roads and other property, were damaged. An updated information on the consequences of attacks by the armed forces of Armenia as at 18 April 2016 is attached (see enclosure).

Armenia's offensive actions also caused casualties and injuries among the servicemen of the armed forces of Azerbaijan. On 10 April 2016, the International Committee of the Red Cross facilitated the handover, between the sides, of the bodies of those killed in action following the recent escalation. Subsequently performed forensic medical examination registered numerous signs of post-mortem mutilation of the bodies of Azerbaijani servicemen.

By its deliberate offensive actions, Armenia undermined the ceasefire regime established in 1994 and endangered the prospects of the political settlement of the conflict. In Moscow, on 5 April 2016, under the mediation efforts of the Russian Federation, the ceasefire was agreed between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Despite that, Armenia continues to violate that agreement by firing at the positions of the armed forces of Azerbaijan and the towns and villages situated along the line of contact with the use of large-calibre machine guns, mortars, grenade launchers and artillery systems.

Armenia's direct and deliberate attacks against the Azerbaijani civilian population and civilian property, as well as inhuman acts against Azerbaijani military forces, constitute a serious violation of international humanitarian and human rights law, in particular the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I thereto, the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its protocols, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Along with the Republic of Armenia's responsibility as a State for internationally wrongful acts, violations by Armenia of international humanitarian and human rights law during the conflict amount to crimes under international criminal law. The overall assessment of the causes and consequences of the war unleashed by Armenia against Azerbaijan make it absolutely clear that the crimes committed by Armenia during the conflict were not isolated or sporadic acts, but were part of Armenia's widespread and systematic policy and practice of atrocities. The Republic of Azerbaijan is confident that the consistent measures being taken at the national level, as well as the existing international legal framework, will serve to bring to justice those responsible for the grave offences committed in the course of Armenia's aggression against Azerbaijan.

The Republic of Azerbaijan urges the international community to condemn Armenia for blatant violation of international law and to insist on the implementation of the aforementioned Security Council resolutions. The conflict can only be resolved on the basis of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders. The Republic of Azerbaijan will spare no effort towards achieving the political settlement of the conflict and ensuring peace and justice in the region.

21 April 2016

Enclosure

Information on the consequences of the armed attacks by Armenia against the civilian population and the property of the Republic of Azerbaijan since 2 April 2016

(As at 18 April 2016)

			Including districts				
		Total	*Aghdam*	*Tartar*	*Goranboy*	*Fuzuli*	*Aghjabadi*
1.	Number of shelled settlements	34	16	9	5	1	3
2.	Number of fired projectiles	95	65	15	7	1	7
3.	Number of civilians killed	4	1	3			
4.	Number of civilians wounded and injured	26	10	8	6	1	1
5.	**Damaged buildings**	353	98	170	85		
	Residential houses	314	72	163	79		
	• Completely destroyed houses	14	5 (Evoglu, 2; Gervend, 1; Saridjali, 1; Uchoglan, 1)		9 (Tap Garagoyunlu)		
	• Severely damaged houses	25		25 (Tartar city, 3; Shikharkh district, 4; Gapanli, 12; Yukhari Garadagli, 3; Azad Garagoyunlu, 1; Duyarli, 1; Garaaqadji, 1)			
	• Damaged houses	275	67	138	70		
	Non-residential buildings	13 (3 schools; 3 kindergartens; 2 medical points; 1 cultural centre; 1 building of the public administration; 3 buildings belonging to business)	4 (1 school (Saridjali); 1 kindergarten (Saridjali); 1 building of the public administration (Afatli); 1 store (Saridjali))	5 (2 schools (Garaagadji, Gapanli); 2 medical points (Yukhari Gapanli, Gapanli); 1 kindergarten (Gazyan))	4 (1 cultural centre; 1 kindergarten (Tapgaragoyunlu); 2 buildings belonging to business (Zeyve, Tap Garagoyunlu))		
	Other types of buildings	26	22	2	2		
6.	Perished livestock	290	110	120	60		

		Total	Including districts				
			Aghdam	*Tartar*	*Goranboy*	*Fuzuli*	*Aghjabadi*
7.	Affected sown areas (in hectares)	208 ha of grain; 28 ha of beetroot		208 ha of grain (Garaagadji,100 ha; Yukhari Garadagli, 50 ha; Shikharkh, 30 ha; Husenli, 28 ha); 28 ha of beetroot (Husenli)			
8.	Damaged electricity infrastructure	3 power substations in 3 villages; 30 transformers in 9 villages; 357 electricity poles, 297 traverses, 1,084 isolators, 49 counters, 3 km of cables, 41.7 km of wires in 14 villages	1 power substation; 2 transformers; 60 electricity poles (Evoglu village)	2 power substations (Ismayilbeyli and Demirchiler); 8 transformers in 3 villages; 137 electricity poles (12 villages); 137 traverses, 288 isolators, 49 counters, 20.8 km wires, 3 km cables	20 transformers; 10 kWh electricity poles, 56; 0.4 kWh electricity poles, 104 (5 villages); 20.9 km wires, 796 isolators, 160 traverses (Tap Garagoyunlu)		
9.	Damaged water supply infrastructure	15 subartesian wells in 8 villages; water reservoirs and water lines in 3 villages		14 subartesian wells (in 7 villages); water reservoirs and water lines in Gapanli and Garadagli villages	1 subartesian well; water line of 1,650 m (Tap Garagoyunlu)		
10.	Damaged gas supply infrastructure	Pipelines in 5 villages; 15 counters in 1 village		Pipelines in Gapanli, Duyerli, Kocherli, Garadagli and Gaynag villages	15 counters (Tap Garagoyunlu)		
11.	Damaged communication infrastructure	9 560 m of cables, 320 m of wires, 17 communication poles in 7 villages		7,780 m of cables (Yukhari Garadagli, Garaagadji, Gazyan); 10 telephone poles	1,100 m of cables, 7 telephone poles (Tap Garagoyunlu); 320 m of wires (Zeyve); 680 m of cables (Gargudjag, Hadjalli)		
12.	Damaged road infrastructure	4 km of the Tap Garagoyunlu-Naftalan road fell into disrepair		3 km of road in Gapanli village has been damaged	4 km of the Tap Garagoyunlu- Naftalan road fell into disrepair		

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Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 20 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am writing to draw your attention to the continued ceasefire violations by the Azerbaijani armed forces and to the violations recorded for the month of March 2016 (see annex).*

During the month of March, as a result of the military activities by Azerbaijan, 1 serviceman was killed, while 17 servicemen, as well as 2 civilians, were wounded.

These and all previous acts of military activities by the armed forces of Azerbaijan across the line of contact between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan and the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan constitute a systematic gross violation of the trilateral ceasefire agreement of 1994 and the trilateral agreement on the consolidation of the ceasefire of 1995.

From the very beginning of the latest Azerbaijani offensive, the civilian infrastructures and civilian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, including children and the elderly, became intentional and indiscriminate targets. Among the first civilian victims were the 12-year-old boy who was killed in front of a school building as a result of a Grad missile attack and two other schoolchildren who were wounded.

Three elderly persons, including a 92-year-old woman, were brutally tortured, mutilated and killed. Moreover, three captive soldiers of the Nagorno-Karabakh armed forces were beheaded by Azerbaijani armed forces in ISIL style, which was subsequently celebrated in the towns and villages of Azerbaijan and publicized through their social networks. During the exchange of bodies of the deceased between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan, carried out through the mediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Office of the Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), it was registered that the bodies of the deceased transferred by the Azerbaijani side bore the evidence of severe torture and mutilation.

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

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At the time of writing of the present letter, violations of the ceasefire regime by the armed forces of Azerbaijan have been continuing. As a result, since the beginning of Azerbaijan's aggression on 2 April and to date, Nagorno-Karabakh has suffered a total of 96 casualties, including civilians. Considerable damage has been inflicted upon the civilian settlements and the infrastructure of Nagorno-Karabakh. A detailed account of this aggression will be duly provided.

The immediate cessation of hostilities and ceasefire violations, the establishment of a mechanism for investigation of the ceasefire violations, as well as the peaceful resolution of the conflict in line with the agreed format of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, are an imperative.

I kindly request that the present letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 20 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1-31 March 2016

In the framework of informational exchange between the Ministries of Defence of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh according to the operation data received from the Defence Army of Nagorno-Karabakh

1. On the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh:

   Total number of incidents: 3,332

   Total number of shots: 60,221

   Small arms and light weapons (5.45-7.62 mm): 53,421; sniper weapons (7.62 mm): 1,865; large-calibre sniper weapons (12.7-14.5 mm): 488; large-calibre machine guns (12.7-14.5 mm): 3,972; grenade launchers (30-40 mm): 141; multiple-launch rocket system (TR-107 mm): 45; small-calibre mortars (60-82 mm): 289.

2. On the border with the Republic of Armenia (see table below):

   Total number of incidents: 368

   Total number of shots: 7,900

   Small arms and light weapons (5.45-7.62 mm): 6.222; sniper weapons (7. 62mm): 493; large-calibre sniper weapons (12. 7-14. 5 mm): 502; large-calibre machine guns (12. 7-14. 5 mm): 565; multiple-launch rocket system (TR-107 mm): 7; small-calibre mortars (60-82 mm): 25; grenade launchers (30-40 mm): 74; artillery: 12.

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
1.	1 March	Paravakar	1250	Small arms	10	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	2	
2.		Aygehovit	2100	Sniper weapon	4	
3.		Berkaber	2310	Small arms	30	
4.	2 March	Barekamavan	0215	Large-calibre machine gun	30	At 1730, near the village of Asbaghi Abdurakhmanli, on the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh, soldier Narek Danielyan was wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.
5.		Berkaber	1445	Small arms	2	
6.		Koti	2110		15	
7.			2120		10	
8.		Aygedzor	2230		60	
9.			2340		15	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
10.	3 March	Chinari	0030	Small arms	10	At 1610, near the village of Chinari, soldier Sevak Poghosyan was wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.
11.			0030		10	
12.			1005	Sniper weapon	2	
13.			1300	Small arms	17	
14.			1610	Sniper weapon	15	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	8	
15.			1720	Small arms	20	
16.			1720	Large-calibre machine gun	20	
					10	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	10	
17.			1720	Small arms	25	
18.			1745		50	
19.			1755	Small arms	50	
					40	
20.			1750	Small arms	30	
21.			2240		15	
22.			2345	Small arms	10	
					10	
23.			2350	Small arms	40	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	4	
24.		Voskepar	1008	Small arms	20	
25.		Aygedzor	1035	Sniper weapon	20	
				Small arms	50	
26.			1805	Small arms	10	
27.			1520	Large-calibre sniper weapon	15	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of incidents
28.		Aygepar	1045	Small arms	8	
29.			1130		7	
30.			1345		3	
31.		Movses	1345		5	
32.		Yeraskh	1840-1845		2	
33.			1855		2	
34.		N. Karmiraghbyur	2040		15	
35.	4 March	Aygehovit	0140	Small arms	8	At 1520, near the village of Nuzger, on the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh, 7 soldiers, Arshavir Baghdasaryan, Paruyr Mkhoyan, Alyosh Asatryan, Mher Khachatryan, Edgar Chilingaryan, Artak Amiryan and Veran Chilingaryan, received shrapnel wounds from the Azerbaijani side.
36.		Chinari	0300	Small arms	4	
37.			0950	Large-calibre sniper weapon	2	
38.			1700		10	
39.			1715		7	
40.		Kayanavan	1700	Small arms	4	
41.			1705	Sniper weapon	4	
42.		Berdavan	1720	Small arms	30	
43.			1725	Sniper weapon	10	
44.		Aygedzor	1735	Small arms	70	
				Sniper weapon	30	
45.	5 March	Kayanavan	2245	Small arms	40	
46.		Koti	1900	Small arms	40	
				Sniper weapon	35	
47.	6 March	Aygehovit	0015	Small arms	5	
48.		Chinari	0905		4	
49.		Koti	1450		35	
50.		Aygepar	1515		10	
51.		Paravaqar	2040		15	
52.		Kayanavan	2050	Large-calibre sniper weapon	2	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
53.	7 March	Paravakar	0920	Small arms	20	At 1545, near the village of Levonarkh, on the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh, soldier Norayr Kotsinyan was wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.
54.			1120		8	
55.		Aygedzor	1010		6	
56.		Berdavan	1250	Small arms	50	
				Sniper weapon	20	
57.		Barekamavan	1420	Large-calibre sniper weapon	7	
58.				Large-calibre machine gun	20	
59.		Chinari	1430	Small arms	3	
60.			1435		4	
61.			1445	Sniper weapon	2	
62.			1450	Small arms	5	
63.			2145		10	
64.		Kayan	2010	Small arms	5	
65.		Berkaber	2245		50	
66.	8 March	Aygehovit	0020	Small arms	25	
67.			0040	Sniper weapon	3	
68.		Paravakar	1040	Small arms	1	
69.		Aygedzor	1210	Small arms	50	
70.			2230		50	
71.			2235		50	
72.			2250		50	
73.		Chinari	1255	Sniper weapon	4	
74.		Kayan	1850	Sniper weapon	3	
				Small arms	3	
75.	9 March	Bardzruni	1125	Small arms	7	
76.		Chinari	1340	Small arms	4	
				Sniper weapon	4	
77.			1350	Small arms	20	
					27	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of incidents
78.			1355	Sniper weapon	7	
79.		Vahan	1610	Sniper weapon	4	
80.		Daranak	1650	Small arms	30	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	6	
81.			1720	Large-calibre sniper weapon	1	
82.		Kayan	1650	Sniper weapon	3	
83.	10 March	Aygepar	0155	Small arms	10	
84.			0950	Sniper weapon	10	
85.		Vazashen	0930	Large-calibre machine gun	50	
				Small arms	20	
86.			0940	Large-calibre machine gun	20	
87.		Paravakar	1000	Large-calibre sniper weapon	5	
88.			2205	Small arms	1	
89.		Berkaber	1020	Small arms	5	
90.			1340	Sniper weapon	5	
91.			1520		10	
92.			1920	Small arms	15	
93.			2055		60	
94.			2120		50	
95.		Aygedzor	1045	Sniper weapon	25	
96.			1300	Sniper weapon	15	
				Small arms	50	
					60	
97.			2100	Large-calibre sniper weapon	25	
98.		Chinari	1145	Sniper weapon	15	
				Small arms	10	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
99.			1345	Small arms	10	
100.			1815	Sniper weapon	45	
101.		Movses	1320	Small arms	10	
102.		Agarak	1350	Small arms	35	
103.			2100		30	
104.		Kayan	1830	Grenade launcher	4	
105.			1940		2	
106.			2055	Small arms	40	
107.	11 March	Chinari	1105	Small arms	20	
108.		Sarigyugh	1130	Grenade launcher	1	
109.			1230	Large-calibre sniper weapon	3	
110.		Agarak	1300	Small arms	20	
					40	
111.			1315		50	
					50	
112.		Khndzorut	1305		6	
113.		Aygedzor	1405	Large-calibre sniper weapon	15	
114.		Vazashen	1535	Small arms	5	
115.			1600		4	
116.		Baghanis	1555		40	
117.			1605		30	
118.	12 March	Movses	0025	Small arms	1	
119.			0105		1	
120.		Vazashen	0145		19	
121.			0244		6	
122.			1155		10	
123.			1309	Large-calibre sniper weapon	1	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of incidents
124.			2100	Large-calibre sniper weapon	2	
				Small arms	4	
125.			2134	Small arms	8	
126.		Chinari	0330	Sniper weapon	1	
127.			1715	Small arms	5	
128.			2305		10	
129.		Aygepar	0915	Sniper weapon	4	
130.			0925		7	
131.			1110	Small arms	11	
132.		Paravakar	1600	Small arms	15	
133.			2210		5	
134.		Koti	1320		25	
135.		Agarak	1640		40	
136.			2055		15	
137.		Berkaber	1640		50	
138.			2145	Small arms	25	
					50	
139.			2155		25	
					50	
140.		Kayan	1720		10	
141.	13 March	Aygepar	1405	Small arms	1	
142.			1715		1	
143.		Berkaber	1640	Grenade launcher	1	
144.		Chinari	1720	Small arms	50	
145.			1745	Small arms	10	
				Sniper weapon	1	
146.			2250	Small arms	3	
				Large-calibre machine gun	10	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
147.		Aygedzor	1935	Small arms	20	
					35	
148.			2005		25	
149.		Yeraskh	2100		1	
150.		Kayan	2110	Small arms	30	
					150	
				Large-calibre machine gun	8	
151.		Paravakar	2230	Small arms	2	
152.	14 March	Vazashen	1330	Small arms	4	
153.			1500	Sniper weapon	2	
154.		Berdavan	1450	Small arms	250	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	30	
155.			1500	Large-calibre sniper weapon	4	
156.		Chinari	1630	Sniper weapon	10	
				Small arms	25	
157.		Kayan	1750	Small arms	15	
158.		Berqaber	1900	Small arms	40	
159.			2240		50	
					50	
160.		Aygedzor	2010	Large-calibre sniper weapon	4	
161.		Vahan	2055		3	
162.	15 March	Chinari	0945	Small arms	1	
163.			1400	Large-calibre sniper weapon	1	
				Small arms	15	
164.			1820	Small arms	15	
165.			2015		80	
166.			2045	Large-calibre sniper weapon	2	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of incidents
167.		Kayanavan	1915	Small arms	15	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	4	
168.			2015	Small arms	20	
169.		Vazashen	1920	Small arms	10	
170.			2000		5	
171.			2230	Large-calibre sniper weapon	1	
				Small arms	6	
172.			2250	Small arms	45	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	20	
173.		Berdavan	2000	Small arms	30	
174.		Yeraskh	2005		3	
175.		Berkaber	2015		50	
176.			2045		50	
177.		Voskepar	2035	Sniper weapon	1	
178.		Aygedzor	2050	Small arms	20	
179.			2225		40	
180.		Khndzorut	2120		7	
181.	16 March	Vazashen	0220	Small arms	15	
					15	
182.			0337		4	
183.			1340		3	
184.			1540	Large-calibre machine gun	2	
185.		Berkaber	0520	Small arms	15	
186.			1225	Grenade launcher	1	
187.		Sevkar	1155	Sniper weapon	5	
				Small arms	15	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
188.	17 March	Berkaber	0645	Small arms	1	At 1455, near the village of Jraberd, on the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh, soldier Artyom Varderesyan was killed by fire from the Azerbaijani side.
189.			1730		20	
190.			1925		10	
191.		Aygepar	0915	Sniper weapon	11	
192.			1110		15	
				Sniper weapon	5	
193.			1400	Sniper weapon	2	
194.			1150	Small arms	20	
195.		Aygedzor	1120	Large-calibre sniper weapon	30	
196.		N. Karmiraghbyur	1120	Small arms	25	
					30	
197.		Vazashen	1140		20	
198.			1140		10	
199.			1210		15	
					20	
200.			1455		30	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	1	
201.			1520	Small arms	4	
202.			1600		70	
203.			1600	Grenade launcher	3	
204.		Berdavan	1300	Small arms	30	
205.			2045		40	
206.		Chinari	1550	Large-calibre sniper weapon	20	
207.			2025		1	
208.		Aygedzor	1555	Small arms	10	
				Sniper weapon	6	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
209.	18 March	Chinari	0505	Large-calibre sniper weapon	4	
210.			1205	Sniper weapon	2	
211.		Aygepar	0935	Sniper weapon	3	
212.			0940		2	
213.			1435		6	
214.			1440	Small arms	15	
215.		Vazashen	1320	Large-calibre sniper weapon	3	
216.		Berkaber	2040	Sniper weapon	5	
217.		Aygedzor	2150	Small arms	20	
218.	19 March	Berkaber	0840	Sniper weapon	3	
219.			1154		20	
220.		Vazashen	1120		10	
221.		Chinari	1230	Large-calibre machine gun	20	
222.		Berdavan	1820	Small arms	40	
223.		Voskepar	2310		30	
224.	20 March	Vazashen	0205	Small arms	100	
				Large-calibre machine gun	40	
225.			0250	Large-calibre sniper weapon	10	
226.		Chambarak	1710	Large-calibre machine gun	1	
227.		Berdavan	2130	Sniper weapon	10	
				Small arms	20	
228.		Berkaber	2230	Sniper weapon	8	
229.	21 March	Vazashen	1330	Small arms	10	
					25	
230.		Kayan	1835		10	
231.		Aygedzor	2230		30	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
232.	22 March	Berdavan	0030	Small arms	35	
233.		Aygepar	1200	Sniper weapon	4	
234.			1520		3	
235.		Barekamavan	1700	Large-calibre machine gun	15	
236.		Berkaber	1935	Sniper weapon	9	
237.		Aygedzor	1955	Small arms	30	
					50	
238.			2005		25	
					60	
239.		Vazashen	2115		3	
240.		Movses	2150		25	
					15	
241.	23 March	Berkaber	1525	Grenade launcher	1	
				Large-calibre machine gun	15	
242.			1535	Grenade launcher	1	
243.		Movses	1535	Small arms	10	
244.		Barekamavan	1620		15	
245.		Aygedzor	1900		10	
246.	24 March	Barekamavan	1100	Large-calibre machine gun	30	At 2140, near the village of Geytape, on the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh, soldier Hayk Gasparyan was wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.
247.			1145	Small-calibre mortar	1	
248.			1220		7	
249.		Berdavan	1205	Small arms	60	
250.			1650	Grenade launcher	17	
251.				Small arms	10	
252.			1655	Small arms	4	
253.			2050	Grenade launcher	25	
254.		Baghanis	1305	Sniper weapon	4	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of incidents
255.		Koti	1335	Small arms	5	
256.			1335		2	
257.			1415	Large-calibre machine gun	10	
258.		Berqaber	1410	Small arms	50	
259.			1415		50	
260.			1410	Large-calibre sniper weapon	10	
261.			1520	Large-calibre machine gun	1	
262.			1520	Large-calibre sniper weapon	6	
263.			1530		15	
264.		Dovegh	1540	Small arms	30	
265.			1547		20	
266.			1645	Grenade launcher	7	
267.		Chinari	2010	Small arms	50	
				Sniper weapon	8	
268.		Movses	2015	Small arms	10	
269.		Kayan	2345	Small-calibre mortar	2	
270.	25 March	N. Karmiraghbyur	0005	Small arms	2	1. At 1800, Norayr Alikhanyan, from the village of Berkaber, was wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side while in his garden. 2. At 1710, near the village of Gyulistan, on the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh, soldiers Avetiq Navoyan, Vardan Harutyunyan and Torgom Hovhannisyan were wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.
271.		Berkaber	0010	Grenade launcher	3	
272.			0010	Small arms	50	
273.			0110	Grenade launcher	2	
274.			1340	Large-calibre sniper weapon	3	
275.			1630		10	
276.			1635		3	
277.			1655		2	
278.			1300	Sniper weapon	10	
279.				Large-calibre sniper weapon	10	
280.			2220	Small arms	15	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
281.		Kayan	0045	Small arms	30	
282.			0045	Small arms	30	
				Large-calibre machine gun	15	
283.		Movses	1145	Small arms	6	
284.		Berdavan	1415	Small-calibre mortar	1	
285.		Agarak	1600	Large-calibre sniper weapon	10	
				Small arms	20	
286.		Vazashen	2040	Large-calibre sniper weapon	3	
287.		Chinari	2040-2110	Small arms	20	
					80	
					30	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	9	
288.			2050	Large-calibre machine gun	30	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	7	
289.			2225	Small arms	20	
290.	26 March	Berkaber	0940	Small arms	20	1. At 0730, Ervand Firyan, from the village of Taghavard, was wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side while in his garden. 2. At 1440, near the village of Koti, soldier Hayk Revazyan was wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.
291.			1710	Large-calibre sniper weapon	12	
292.			2325	Small arms	30	
					40	
					50	
293.		Koti	1640	Large-calibre machine gun	16	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	5	
294.		Berdavan	1815	Small arms	60	
295.		Chinari	1930	Large-calibre sniper weapon	3	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of incidents
296.	27 March	Berkaber	0010	Small arms	20	At 1535, near the village of Koti, soldier Mher Mkhitaryan was wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.
297.			1735	Sniper weapon	6	
298.			1735	Large-calibre sniper weapon	2	
299.			1750	Small-calibre mortar	3	
300.			1805		2	
301.			1830	Grenade launcher	2	
302.			1900	multiple-launch rocket system	2	
303.			2215	Grenade launcher	3	
				Small arms	15	
304.			2240	Small-calibre mortar	1	
305.		Voskevan	0045	Small arms	3	
306.			1500		12	
					15	
307.			1530		100	
308.					40	
309.			1830		10	
310.			1835		20	
311.			1845		30	
312.		Aygedzor	0115	Large- calibre machine gun	60	
313.		Chinari	0215	Small arms	14	
314.			0225		20	
315.			1740		10	
316.			1740		12	
317.			1915	Small arms	15	
				Sniper weapon	10	
318.			2015	Sniper weapon	1	
319.			2135	Small arms	20	
320.			2145		20	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
321.			2155		8	
322.			2158		7	
323.		Koti	1500	Small arms	10	
324.					10	
325.			1500	Large-calibre machine gun	60	
326.			1535	Sniper weapon	1	
327.			1940	Small-calibre mortar	1	
328.			1945		3	
329.			1948		1	
330.			1955	multiple-launch rocket system	5	
331.			2030	Artillery	3	
332.			2030		4	
333.			2100		3	
334.			2105		2	
335.		Voskepar	1555	Small-calibre mortar	2	
336.		Kirants	1900	Large-calibre sniper weapon	8	
337.		Vahan	2000	Small arms	6	
338.		Kayan	2130	Small arms	10	
339.			2140		8	
340.			2315	Large-calibre machine gun	8	
341.		Sarigyugh	2250	Large-calibre machine gun	4	
342.	28 March	Vahan	0100	Small arms	4	
343.			0100	Small-calibre mortar	1	
344.		Berdavan	1355	Large-calibre sniper weapon	3	
345.		Movses	2125	Small arms	2	
346.		Agarak	2140		50	

No.	Date	Direction	Time	Type of weapon	Ammunition	Results of incidents
347.	29 March	Berdavan	1225	Large-calibre sniper weapon	3	
348.		Berkaber	2220	Small arms	4	
349.		Bardzruni	2310		45	
350.	30 March	Kayan	1308	Large-calibre sniper weapon	25	At 1155, near the village of Karvend, on the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh, soldier Vahan Sargsyan was wounded by fire from the Azerbaijani side.
351.			1930		10	
352.			2000	Small arms	2	
353.		Chinari	1525	Small arms	20	
				Large-calibre machine gun	20	
				Small arms	20	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	5	
354.			1535	Large-calibre machine gun	50	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	20	
355.			1545	Large-calibre machine gun	30	
				Small arms	25	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	10	
356.			1710	Small arms	4	
357.			1717		15	
358.		Agarak	1530	Small arms	50	
359.		Baghanis	1610	Small arms	25	
				Large-calibre sniper weapon	10	
360.		Salvard	1710	Small arms	30	
361.		Aygedzor	1950		15	
362.		Aygehovit	2125		5	
					3	
363.		Berkaber	2215		10	

No.	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of incidents*
364.	31 March	Berdavan	0750	Small arms	31	
365.		Berkaber	1140	Grenade launcher	1	
366.		Aygedzor	1245	Small arms	45	
				Sniper weapon	18	
367.		Jil	1505	Small arms	9	
368.		Chinari	1620	Large-calibre sniper weapon	5	

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Security Council
Seventy-first year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 22 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to draw your attention to the facts proving Armenia's direct responsibility for the occupation of the territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

As we have previously informed you (see A/70/694-S/2016/63), the Republic of Armenia continues to station its military units in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan and to support the separatist regime in the Nagorno-Karabagh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan, especially the so-called "Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army".

The Government of Armenia denies that the servicemen of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia have been fighting and dying on the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan. However, some 80 per cent of the servicemen killed during Armenia's recent large-scale military provocation are from Armenia itself. The list of servicemen is attached (see annex). The list is not exhaustive as it is a usual practice of Armenian government officials to conceal the number of servicemen killed in action. Instead, they often deceive by claiming that these servicemen died during exercises at training camps or even in car accidents.

The illegal presence of the Armenian armed forces on the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan has also become undeniable following the stream of coffins returning to Armenia and the repeated protests by the parents of the killed servicemen in front of the presidential palace in Yerevan demanding explanations as to why their sons had been sent to fight another country.

Particularly noteworthy is that President Serzh Sargsyan of the Republic of Armenia pays visits to the occupied Nagorno-Karabagh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan and awards the so-called servicemen of the so-called "Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army".

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In the light of all the above-mentioned, Armenia's so-called calls for peace and alleged support for the work of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Minsk Group, without withdrawing its armed forces from all the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan and eliminating the consequences of the occupation, are nothing but lofty words to conceal its annexationist policy and mislead the international community.

The continued occupation of a big portion of the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia is the main obstacle to the settlement of the conflict and the only source of hostilities and casualties. If Armenia is genuinely interested in the ceasefire and lasting peace, it should withdraw all its occupying forces from the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions and fulfil its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to which all States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirmed their commitment in October 2015.

The Republic of Azerbaijan will continue to exercise its legitimate right of self-defence against Armenia's ongoing aggression with the ultimate objective of restoring its territorial integrity and sovereignty in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35 and 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 22 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

List of servicemen of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia killed in action during the period 1-5 April 2016 in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as at 13 April 2016, 1500 (as confirmed by Armenian officials and reported in media sources of Armenia)*

Conscripts and volunteer fighters from Armenia

1. Arakelyan Aleksan Gevorg — Lieutenant Colonel, from Gumri, born in 1982
2. Torosyan Hayk Vagan — Major, from Yerevan, born in 1985
3. Urfanyan Armenak Mers — Captain, from Yerevan, born in 1990
4. Kirakosyan Ovsep Gegam — Captain, from Apaga village in Armavir province, born in 1988
5. Galstyan Hrach Vardan — Senior Lieutenant, from Gumri, born in 1991
6. Stepanyan Merujan Artur — Senior Lieutenant, from Gumri, born in 1993
7. Yegonyan Benyamin Nerses — Senior Lieutenant, from Yerevan, born in 1992
8. Gasparyan Armen Karlen — Senior Lieutenant, from Kapan, born in 1974
9. Shahbazyan Ashot Karapet — Lieutenant, from Akhuryan village in Shirak province, born in 1993
10. Melkonyan Gagik Suren — Contracted warrant officer (*praporshik*), from Zolakar village in Gegharkunik province, born in 1982
11. Gasparyan Norik Jora — Sergeant, from Kapan, born in 1996
12. Saakyan Adam Khachatur — Sergeant, from Yerevan, born in 1996
13. Andreasyan Arman Seyran — Sergeant, from Artik village in Shirak province, born in 1996
14. Nersesyan Karen Artak — Sergeant, from Charensavan village in Kotayk province, born in 1997
15. Ghahramanyan Henrik Rudolf — Junior Sergeant, from Masis, born in 1996
16. Galstyan Sasha Vachagan — Junior Sergeant, from Metsamor village in Armavir province, born in 1996
17. Iskandaryan Ruben Ashot — Junior Sergeant, from Yerevan, born in 1993
18. Abadjyan Robert Aleksandr — Junior Sergeant, from Yerevan, born in 1996

* Sources: Facebook page of Artsrun Hovhannisyan, spokesperson of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia; http://ru.a1plus.am/1308866.html; http://panduk.ht.livejournal.com/1351653.html; http://news.am/rus/news/321904.html.

19. Abrahamyan Robert Abraham — Contracted Sergeant, from Taperakan village in Ararat province, born in 1993

20. Sargsyan Vrej Vardan — Contracted soldier, from Pokr Masrik village in Gegharkunik province, born in 1989

21. Abrahamyan Arutyun Hovannes — Contracted soldier, from Areguni village in Gegharkunik province, born in 1985

22. Davtyan Karen Parkev — Contracted soldier, from Vanadzor, born in 1981

23. Muradyan Hrach Samvel — Contracted soldier, from Yerevan, born in 1983

24. Sloyan Karam Kalash — Soldier, from Artashavan village in Aragatsotn province, born in 1996

25. Vardanyan Gevorg Gagik — Soldier, from Gumri, born in 1996

26. Akopyan Rafik Khlgat — Soldier, from Karmrashen village in Aragatsotn province, born in 1996

27. Asatryan Aghasi Sarmen — Soldier, from Masis, born in 1996

28. Yuzixovich Viktor Aleksandr — Soldier, from Gumri, born in 1997

29. Mkrtchyan Narek Vardan — Soldier, from Vorotan village in Syunik province, born in 1996

30. Saakyan Sarkis Armenak — Soldier, from Hrazdan, born in 1995

31. Hayrapetyan David Razmik — Soldier, from Zolakar village in Gegharkunik province, born in 1997

32. Kirakosyan Gor Karapet — Soldier, from Arevik village in Armavir province, born in 1996

33. Zakaryan Vahe Samvel — Soldier, from Hrazdan, born in 1995

34. Mikaelyan Aramais Grigor — Soldier, from Voskeat village in Armavir province, born in 1996

35. Abrahamyan Aram Araik — Soldier, from Artimet village in Armavir province, born in 1996

36. Abgaryan Tigran Aram — Soldier, from Gumri, born in 1996

37. Alikhanyan Vladimir Varujan — Soldier, from Dilijan, born in 1996

38. Mkrtchyan Sasun Fakhrad — Soldier, from Yerevan, born in 1989

39. Mgdesyan Gevorg Ashot — Soldier, from Kotayk province, born in 1996

40. Aramyan Suren Artur — Soldier, from Artashat, born in 1997

41. Avetisyan Grigor Germion — Soldier, from Artashat, born in 1997

42. Zohrabyan Andranik Atom — Soldier, from Ararat province, born in 1996

43. Petrosyan Artak Hayhavard — Soldier, from Metsavan village in Lori province, born in 1997

44. Aghajanyan Misha Kamo — Soldier, from Vardablur village in Aragatsotn province, born in 1996

45. Ozmanyan Boris Rafik — Soldier, from Aknalich village in Armavir province, born in 1996

46. Sargsyan Norik Zaven — Soldier, from Eranos village in Gegharkunik province, 1996

47. Yesayan Jora Artur — Soldier, from Darbnik village in Ararat province, born in 1996

48. Simonyan Azat Kajik — Soldier, from Kamaris village in Kotayk province, born in 1996

49. Gevorkyan Artur Garnik — Soldier, from Abovyan, born in 1997

50. Aleksanyan Bagrat Artur — Soldier, from Yerevan, born in 1995

51. Berakchyan Tigran Eduard — Soldier, from Yerevan, born in 1997

52. Harutunyan Grigor Gevorg — Soldier, from Yerevan, born in 1997

53. Yerznkyan Mher — Soldier, Armenia

54. Khajiyan Norayr — Soldier, Armenia

55. Khalafyan Sarkis Lazar — Volunteer fighter, from Yerevan, born in 1967

56. Hovsepyan Nikolay Sarkis — Volunteer fighter, from Echmiadzin, born in 1953

57. Mirzoyan Mais Yerdjan — Volunteer fighter, from Syunik province

58. Aleksanyan Eduard Yurik — Volunteer fighter, from Darbas village in Syunik province

59. Beglaryan Armen Minas — Volunteer fighter, from Syunik province

60. Dangyan Sergey Gurgen — Volunteer fighter, from Sisian

61. Asryan Sedrak Sergey — Volunteer fighter, from Darbas village in Syunik province

62. Nikalyan Yegish Artavaz — Volunteer fighter, from Ltsen village in Syunik province

63. Sargsyan David Bagrat — Volunteer fighter, from Balak village in Syunik province

64. Parsadanyan Gagik Kolya — Volunteer fighter, from Kapan in Syunik province, born in 1960

65. Chartanyan Suren Misak — Volunteer fighter, from Yerevan, born in 1955

Armenian military servicemen born in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

66. Pogosyan Roman Vladimir — Lieutenant Colonel, from Khojavend, born in 1979

67. Grigoryan Onik Karo — Lieutenant Colonel, from Askeran, born in 1978

68. Melkumyan Suren Grisha — Major, from Khojavend, born in 1979

69. Movsesyan Rudik Bakhshir — Major, from Khankandi, born in 1976

70. Mailyan Ovsep Rafael — Major, from Khojavand, born in 1978

71. Grigoryan Maksim Vagif — Senior Lieutenant, from Khojavand, born in 1986
72. Grigoryan Hayk Rodik — Lieutenant, from Khojavand, born in 1993
73. Gasparyan David Yuriy — Senior Corporal, from Khankandi, born in 1979
74. Margaryan Nodarik Artash — Corporal, from Madagiz village in Tartar, born in 1963
75. Simonyan Nver Saro — Senior sergeant, from Khojavand, born in 1990
76. Saakyan Garib Ayaser — Senior sergeant, from Khojavand, born in 1987
77. Faramazyan Yuriy Anatoly — Sergeant, from Khojavand, born in 1996
78. Narinyan Vladik Stepan — Junior sergeant, from Khojavand, born in 1996
79. Garibyan Hrant Samvel — Soldier, from Khankandi, born in 1947
80. Balayan Aznavur Rafik — Soldier, from Khojavand, born in 1987
81. Tadevosyan Vardan Surik — Soldier, from Khojavand, born in 1990
82. Mkrtchyan Gegam Rashid — Soldier, from Vank village in Tartar, born in 1986
83. Grigoryan Andranik Marat — Soldier, from Khojavand, born in 1986

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Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
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Letter dated 21 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am writing to inform you that in the early hours of 2 April 2016, in breach of the trilateral ceasefire agreement of 1994 and the trilateral agreement on the consolidation of ceasefire of 1995, both without time limitations, the armed forces of Azerbaijan unleashed a massive military operation along the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh with the use of heavy artillery, multiple rocket launchers, heavy flame thrower systems, armoured vehicles, tanks and air force. The positions of the Defence Army of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as civilian infrastructure and settlements have been under severe attack.

The indiscriminate shelling of the civilian population resulted in the death of 12-year-old Vaghinak Grigoryan and the wounding of another two 12-year-old schoolchildren in the town of Martuni in Nagorno-Karabakh. The incursion in the village of Talish of the Martakert region of Nagorno-Karabakh resulted in barbaric acts committed by the armed forces of Azerbaijan, including the torture, maiming and killing of three elderly civilians, Ms. Marusya Khalapyan, Ms. Razmela Vardanyan and Mr. Valeri Khalapyan. Three soldiers of the Nagorno-Karabakh defence force, Karam Sloyan, Hayk Toroyan and Hrant Gharibyan were savagely beheaded. Footage of a severed head of a soldier of the Nagorno-Karabakh defence force has been publicly celebrated in the towns, villages and social networks of Azerbaijan. The Nagorno-Karabakh State Commission on Prisoners of War, Hostages and Missing Persons in the presence of representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross registered signs of severe torture and mutilation on the deceased bodies transferred by the Azerbaijani side. The Office of the Prosecutor General of Nagorno-Karabakh has initiated criminal cases in relation to the serious violations by the armed forces of Azerbaijan of the norms of international humanitarian law during the armed clashes occurring from 2 to 4 April 2016. I attach herewith the reference of the Office of the Prosecutor General (see annex I)* and the statement of the State Commission of 11 April (see annex II).**

* Annex I is being circulated in the language of submission only.
** Annex II is being circulated in English and Russian only.

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These and other gross violations of core international instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Geneva Conventions of 1949 have been duly brought to the attention of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

On 5 April a verbal arrangement was reached on the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the ceasefire agreement of May 1994. However, Azerbaijan continues the violations of the 1994 ceasefire agreement. Since 2 April and up until today Nagorno-Karabakh has suffered a total of 96 casualties.

Since the signing of the 1994 trilateral ceasefire agreement, Azerbaijan has been in continuous breach of the agreement, with a particularly high intensity of violations and the use of heavy artillery during 2014 and 2015. Azerbaijan has been explicit in its ambition to seek a military solution to the conflict and has been incrementally raising the tensions in the region. These policies were coupled with the consistent refusal to engage constructively in the negotiations for the peaceful settlement of the conflict under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group co-chairmanship, to implement confidence- and security-building measures, particularly to establish an investigative mechanism for the ceasefire violations, to strengthen the capacities of the Office of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office. The perfidious attempts to justify its latest large-scale military offensive by way of allegations of ceasefire violations by Nagorno-Karabakh are fully rejected. Furthermore, this latest escalation by Azerbaijan follows the logic of the long-standing policy of incitement to hatred against Armenians at the highest level, which led to extreme radicalization of the society in Azerbaijan, including among the youth.

Armenia has been consistently warning the international community, including through the United Nations, about the aggressive policies of Azerbaijan and their failure to commit to the peaceful settlement within the agreed format of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship. The latest military operation instigated by Azerbaijan has been unprecedented in its scale, the use of armaments and the losses inflicted. The continuation of military actions by Azerbaijan may lead to dangerous consequences, the full responsibility for which lies solely with the authorities of Azerbaijan. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh have no reason, interest, necessity or purpose to escalate the situation. They have consistently reiterated their full commitment to the peaceful settlement of the conflict and to the establishment of confidence-building measures aimed at consolidating the ceasefire regime. This position remains unwavering. The latest escalation and the accompanying atrocities stand proof of the existential threat to the people of Nagorno-Karabakh and the impossibility of a future for them under the rule of Azerbaijan. The atrocities committed by Azerbaijan evoke memories of massacres against Armenians in Sumgait, Baku, Kirovabad and elsewhere at the wake of the conflict. People of Nagorno-Karabakh have the right to self-defence. As a guarantor of their physical security, Armenia will stand by them.

As a matter of urgency and an immediate objective, Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh underline the imperative of halting all ceasefire violations and the return of troops to positions and installations, which they held by 1 April, in full adherence to the 1994 trilateral ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh

and Armenia, the immediate establishment of an investigative mechanism for the ceasefire violations, and the strengthening of the capacities of the Office of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office. Of equal importance and immediate priority is the full revitalization of the negotiations for the peaceful settlement of the conflict based on the principles and elements outlined in five statements of the presidents of the co-chair countries.

Armenia has expressed its appreciation to the international community, including to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for the unequivocal condemnation of the latest military escalation and for the unwavering support to the activities of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs as the only agreed format for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. It is, however, necessary to identify and hold Azerbaijan accountable both for the use of force and for threatening peace and security in the region. Any position within the international community, which is based on bias and religious affiliation, should be rejected. Azerbaijan should be further denied any "forum shopping" and abuse of the United Nations, and distortion of the purpose and substance of Security Council resolutions, and should be urged to adhere strictly to the peaceful settlement of the conflict within the internationally agreed format of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmanship.

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex I to the letter dated 21 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Reference of the Office of the Prosecutor General on criminal cases initiated in relation to serious violations by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan of the norms of international humanitarian law during armed clashes from 2 to 4 April 2016

1. Criminal Case No. 131006.16 on elements of crimes provided for in paragraph 1, part 1, of article 416 (Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law during Armed Conflicts), paragraphs 1 and 6, part 2, of article 416, and paragraph 2, part 3, of article 416 of the Criminal Code of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic

During 2 and 3 April 2016, Azerbaijani armed forces, aiming to achieve military advantage, in flagrant violation of international law, using prohibited means and methods of warfare and gravely violating norms of international humanitarian law, indiscriminately attacked civilian population in the deep rear of the line of contact. In the village of Talish of the NKR Martakert region, Azerbaijani armed forces with particular cruelty, deliberately and unlawfully deprived Razmela Vardanyan (born in 1956), Valerik Khalapyan (born in 1951) and Marusya Khalapyan (born in 1924) of their lives by:

- Inflicting a gunshot wound in the right side of the face, mutilation of both ears, four gunshot wounds to the left arm, two gunshot wounds to the left side of the chest and two in the back of Razmela Vardanyan
- Gunshot wounds on the right buccal part, left part of the lower jaw, right lateral surface of the neck with damage to the carotid artery, mutilation of both ears, multiple gunshot wounds to the chest and the back of Valerik Khalapyan, as well as an injury to the right temporal part
- Gunshot wounds to the left side of the upper jaw, left lateral part of the neck, the shoulder, left lateral part of the back and mutilation of the left ear of Marusya Khalapyan

As part of the same criminal case, a preliminary investigation on the following incidents is also under way:

On 4 April 2016, at around 2.30 p.m., Azerbaijani armed forces on the grounds of national, racial or religious hatred or religious fanaticism, and for the purpose of intentional and unlawful deprivation of the lives of two or more persons, using rocket artillery systems, in a manner dangerous to the lives of many, shelled the civilian objects in the residential areas of Martouni town. As a result, a resident of the same town, Irina Baghdasaryan (born in 1958), received shrapnel wounds to the right arm and the surface of the rear chest wall.

On 4 April 2016, at around 7 p.m., Azerbaijani armed forces on the grounds of national, racial or religious hatred or religious fanaticism, and for the purpose of intentional and unlawful deprivation of the lives of two or more persons, as well as with the aim of intentional destruction of particularly large amounts of property, using rocket artillery systems, in a manner dangerous to the lives of many, shelled

the civilian objects in the residential areas of Askeran town. As a result, a cafeteria owned by a resident of the same town, Eric Gabrielyan (born in 1978), suffered damages, causing the latter a particularly large amount of material loss.

2. **Criminal Case No. 171010.16 initiated on 2 April 2016 under paragraphs 6 and 14, part 2, of article 103 (Murder), and paragraphs 1, 6 and 14, part 2, of article 103 of the Criminal Code of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic**

On 2 April 2016, at around 8.40 a.m., Azerbaijani armed forces on the grounds of national, racial or religious hatred or religious fanaticism, and for the purpose of intentional and unlawful deprivation of the lives of two or more persons, using rocket artillery systems, in a manner dangerous to the lives of many, shelled the village of Zoravan of the Martouni region. As a result, a resident of the village of Her-Her of the same region, Vagharshak Tatoul Grigoryan (born in 2004), receiving shrapnel wounds to the neck, trachea, the oesophagus and the left carotid artery, died on the spot. Three other residents of the same community were wounded. Vardan Vladik Andreassian (born in 2005) received a shrapnel wound in the upper third of the thigh and fracture of the femoral bone, while Gevorg Tatoul Grigoryan (born in 2005) got a shrapnel wound of the thigh with extensive soft tissue injury, and Gorik Tatoul Grigoryan (born in 2005) received a scratch on the eyebrow.

3. **Criminal Case No. 161013.16 initiated on 2 April 2016 under article 33 (Attempt to commit a crime) and paragraphs 6 and 14, part 2, of article 103 (Murder), of the Criminal Code of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic**

On 2 April 2016, at around 6.30 a.m., Azerbaijani armed forces on the grounds of national, racial or religious hatred or religious fanaticism, and for the purpose of intentional and unlawful deprivation of the lives of two or more persons, using rocket artillery systems, in a manner dangerous to the lives of many, shelled the village of Madaghis of the Martakert region. As a result, the head of the same community, Zaven Somik Avanessyan (born in 1985), received multiple shrapnel wounds to the head and torso.

4. **Criminal Case No. 161014.16 initiated on 2 April 2016 under article 33 (Attempt to commit a crime) and paragraphs 6 and 14, part 2, of article 103 (Murder), of the Criminal Code of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic**

On 2 April 2016, at around 9 a.m., Azerbaijani armed forces on the grounds of national, racial or religious hatred or religious fanaticism, and for the purpose of intentional and unlawful deprivation of the lives of two or more persons, using rocket artillery systems, in a manner dangerous to the lives of many, shelled the village of Talish of the Martakert region. As a result, a resident of the same village, Tsovinar Vladimir Aghajanyan (born in 1961), received shrapnel injuries to the upper third of the right arm bone.

5. **Criminal Case No. 161015.16 initiated on 2 April 2016 under article 33 (Attempt to commit a crime) and paragraphs 6 and 14, part 2, of article 103 (Murder), of the Criminal Code of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic**

On 2 April 2016, at around 9 a.m., Azerbaijani armed forces on the grounds of national, racial or religious hatred or religious fanaticism, and for the purpose of intentional and unlawful deprivation of the lives of two or more persons, using

rocket artillery systems, in a manner dangerous to the lives of many, shelled the village of Talish of the Martakert region. As a result, a resident of the same village, Garegin Vladimir Aghajanyan (born in 1973), received abdominal shrapnel wounds.

6. **Criminal Case No. 161016.16 initiated on 2 April 2016 under article 33 (Attempt to commit a crime) and paragraphs 6 and 14, part 2, of article 103 (Murder), of the Criminal Code of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic**

On 2 April 2016, at around 7.55 p.m., Azerbaijani armed forces on the grounds of national, racial or religious hatred or religious fanaticism, and for the purpose of intentional and unlawful deprivation of the lives of two or more persons, using rocket artillery systems, in a manner dangerous to the lives of many, shelled the village of Madaghis of the Martakert region. As a result, a resident of the same village, Kamo Arshavir Abrahamyan (born in 1961), received multiple shrapnel wounds to the body.

7. **Criminal Case No. 161017.16 initiated on 2 April 2016 under article 33 (Attempt to commit a crime) and paragraphs 6 and 14, part 2, of article 103 (Murder), of the Criminal Code of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic**

On 2 April 2016, at around 3 a.m., Azerbaijani armed forces on the grounds of national, racial or religious hatred or religious fanaticism, and for the purpose of intentional and unlawful deprivation of the lives of two or more persons, using rocket artillery systems, in a manner dangerous to the lives of many, shelled the village of Talish of the Martakert region. As a result, a resident of the same village, Kamo Garik Ohanyan (born in 1999), received shrapnel injuries to the left knee.

9 April 2016

Annex II to the letter dated 21 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and Russian]

Statement of the State Commission on Prisoners of War, Hostages and Missing Persons

On 10 April, in accordance with the arrangement reached earlier, the State Commission on Prisoners of War, Hostages and Missing Persons of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic, through the mediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Office of the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, carried out the exchange of bodies of the deceased between the Nagorno Karabakh Republic (NKR) and Azerbaijan near the Bash Karvend settlement. The bodies of 18 servicemen of the NKR Defence Army, fallen as a result of the large-scale military aggression unleashed by Azerbaijan from 2 to 5 April, were transferred to the NKR side during the exchange.

At the presence of the representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the NKR State Commission on Prisoners of War, Hostages and Missing Persons registered that all bodies of the decreased transferred by the Azerbaijani side had signs of torture and mutilation.

Those acts, being a flagrant manifestation of inhumanity, run counter to the laws and customs of war and are in grave violation of international humanitarian law, in particular, the Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (1949), Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949) and the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I).

The Karabakh side will seek to ensure that such behaviour of the Azerbaijani side is condemned in the strongest terms by the international community and the specialized agencies, and those responsible are brought into account.

11 April 2016

United Nations A/70/846–S/2016/379

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
26 April 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda items 16, 34, 68, 70, 71 and 72

Culture of peace

Prevention of armed conflict

Promotion and protection of the rights of children

Elimination of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance

Right of peoples to self-determination

Promotion and protection of human rights

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 22 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a statement of the Republic of Armenia in relation to the Seventh Global Forum of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, to be held from 25 to 27 April 2016 (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 16, 34, 68, 70, 71 and 72, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

16-06870 (E) 030516

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 22 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement by Armenia in relation to the Seventh Global Forum of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations

In the early hours of 2 April 2016, Azerbaijan unleashed large-scale offensive operations against Nagorno-Karabakh, thus violating trilateral agreements of 1994 on a ceasefire and of 1995 on the consolidation of the ceasefire, signed by Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, which do not have time limits. Azerbaijan has violated basic principles of international law and the decisions and declarations adopted by the Summits and Ministerial Councils of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), blatantly disregarding the statements of the Presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair countries — the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the French Republic — on the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

From the very beginning of the Azerbaijani offensive, the civilian infrastructure and civilian population, including children and the elderly, became their intentional and indiscriminate targets. Among the first civilian victims were a 12-year-old boy who was killed in front of a school building as a result of a Grad missile attack and two other schoolchildren who were wounded.

Three elderly persons, including a 92-year-old woman, were brutally tortured, mutilated and killed. Moreover, three captive soldiers of the Nagorno-Karabakh armed forces were beheaded by Azerbaijani armed forces in ISIL style, which was subsequently celebrated in the towns and villages and publicized through social networks. Furthermore, during the exchange of bodies of the deceased between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan, carried out through the mediation of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Office of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, it was registered that the bodies of the deceased transferred by the Azerbaijani side bore evidence of severe torture and mutilation.

Those barbaric acts of Azerbaijan, going beyond elementary norms of a civilized world, constitute violations of core international instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In this context, it is also imperative to specifically mention the blatant violation by Azerbaijan of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which, inter alia, address groups exposed to specific risks, such as children, women and the elderly, and their additional protocols of 1977.

Azerbaijan demonstrates its total disregard for international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The persistent violations of human rights inside Azerbaijan and the consistent attacks on and imprisonment of its civil society representatives, the media and human rights defenders, coupled with the regular dissemination of intolerance and hatred against the Armenian people, provide a breeding ground for the criminal military adventurism of the Azerbaijani regime.

At the time of the gathering of the Seventh Global Forum of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations, the armed forces of Azerbaijan continue to violate the ceasefire, with new losses of human life. Since the beginning of the Azerbaijani aggression and to date as a result of Azerbaijan's aggression, hundreds have been killed and wounded, including civilians. This is a manifestation of the absurdity of celebrating a more peaceful and socially inclusive world and building mutual respect among peoples of different cultural and religious identities in a country that is engaged in barbarity and killings a few hundred kilometres away from the venue of the Forum. This is an affront to the image and the integrity of the Alliance.

In this dire situation, the convening of the Seventh Global Forum of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations should have been cancelled in Azerbaijan, a country that grossly violates the very aims, principles and values of the Alliance of Civilizations.

Armenia is committed to the purposes of the Alliance of Civilizations and remains its friend. However, given the circumstances, Armenia does not join the consensus on the Declaration of the Seventh Global Forum of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations. Therefore, in the absence of consensus, the Declaration cannot be adopted.

Armenia rejects the Seventh Forum in its entirety, including its outcome.

United Nations A/70/847–S/2016/390

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
27 April 2016

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 72 (c)
Promotion and protection of human rights: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 26 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the decision of the illegal judicial authority of the occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea to ban the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people (see annex).*

I would appreciate your kind assistance in having the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 72 (c), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Volodymyr **Yelchenko**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

16-06926 (E) 290416

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 26 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on the decision of the illegal judicial authority of the occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea to ban the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people

Kyiv, 26 April 2016

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its resolute protest over the so-called "decision" of the illegal judicial authority of the occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea to ban the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people by declaring it an extremist organization.

The ban on the Mejlis, a key representative body of the Crimean Tatar people, which acts on the basis of the principle of non-violence, has become yet another flagrant violation by the occupying authorities of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

This unprecedented repressive decision represents clear-cut evidence of systematic persecution of the Crimean Tatars owing to their firm position regarding the illegal occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation.

Ukraine strongly urges the occupying State to reverse immediately this null and void decision and stop oppressing the Crimean Tatar community in the occupied Crimea.

This situation once again demonstrates the urgent need to step up the international community's efforts to protect human rights in the occupied Crimea and to safeguard the unfettered access of international human rights organizations to monitor the human rights situation on the ground.

Halting the systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the occupied Crimea, as well as repression and intimidation, is possible only by making the occupying State stop its aggression against Ukraine and strictly comply with international law and its international legal obligations. In this regard, Ukraine calls upon its partners, first of all the key guarantors of its security under the Budapest Memorandum, to intensify the efforts to establish an international mechanism for the de-occupation of Crimea.

United Nations A/70/848–S/2016/389

General Assembly
Security Council

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27 April 2016

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General Assembly
Seventieth session
Agenda item 34
Prevention of armed conflict

Security Council
Seventy-first year

Letter dated 25 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon the instructions of my Government, I am transmitting herewith the press release of the Ministry of Defence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, dated 21 April 2016 (see annex I), and information (see annex II)* concerning the actions and of the documents seized from the downed Azerbaijani air force Mi-24G attack helicopter, which was carrying out a combat flight during the military aggression of Azerbaijan against the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in the beginning of April. The evidence contained therein demonstrates the advance planning of the aggression by the leadership of Azerbaijan.

I kindly request that the present letter and its annexes be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Zohrab **Mnatsakanyan**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annex is being circulated in the languages of submission only.

Annex I to the letter dated 25 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and Russian]

Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh
Ministry of Defence

21 April 2016

Press release

On 2 April 2016, the Defence Army of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic downed an Azerbaijani air force Mi-24G attack helicopter, which was carrying out a combat flight during the military aggression of Azerbaijan against the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. The following has been collected from the crash site of the downed helicopter:

(a) Flight maps;

(b) Pilot tablets;

(c) User manual for night-vision equipment;

(d) Personal notebook of one of the pilots;

(e) VHF ACR500-A 30-420 MHz radio;

(f) ARK-U2 automatic radio compass;

(g) SARPP-12 flight data recorder with a cassette;

(h) Part of the helmet-mounted night-vision device;

(i) Ten links with eight 20-mm cannon shells;

(j) Optoelectronic module with a gyro-stabilized platform.

The analysis of data from the seized property (flight documentation) revealed that:

(a) Between 31 March and 1 April 2016, the downed Mi-24G, as part of a squadron, flew from Baku "Kala" air base to "Zhdanovsk" with a stopover at "Kyurdamir" air base;

(b) The route and the specified targets on the flight map indicate that the crew was tasked with attacking targets in the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic at a depth of 3 to 10 kilometres from the line of contact;

(c) According to the flight map, an advanced landing ground had been prepared to reduce the time for aircraft to go into combat;

(d) In the area of mount Lyalya Ilyagi, a grid was applied with the possible directions of aviation spotters' work with a group of army aviation helicopters;

(e) The total duration of the flight of the downed helicopter is about three hours;

(f) Objective control data contain records of three separate flights, including the last one.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Defence Ministry earlier provided this information to the Ministry of Defence of Armenia to introduce it to military attachés of foreign countries accredited in Yerevan.

According to radar reconnaissance of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic air defence forces, during the four-day aggression up to 60 aircraft flights of the Azerbaijani armed forces were recorded, including 40 with the use of various types of weapons on the positions of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Defence Army. This is confirmed by the analysis of the armaments, technical equipment, flight maps and pilot's notebook, as well as the transcript of the SARPP-12 data found at the crash site of the Mi-24G. In the first 12 hours of aggression by the Azerbaijani armed forces, 40 army aviation helicopters were involved.

The actions of the Azerbaijani armed forces, as well as the documents seized from the downed Mi-24G, show that the four-day military aggression of Azerbaijan against the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was planned in advance by the Azerbaijani leadership.

Annex II to the letter dated 25 April 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and Russian]

Information on the Mi-24G attack helicopter, board N305, downed by Nagorno-Karabakh Republic defence forces

2 April 2016
Time: 12.10 p.m.

According to collected data, the downed aircraft is a Mi-24G attack helicopter, board N305, modernized jointly by South Africa and Ukraine

Optoelectronic module with gyro-stabilized platform

Items from the crash site of the downed helicopter

31 March 2016
Relocation of Azerbaijani Air Force helicopters
from Baku Kala air base to Yevlakh and Zhdanovsk
KALA
YEVLAKH
ZHDANOVSK
30 km
30 km

Confirmed by the personal notebook of one of the pilots, withdrawn from the crash site of the downed helicopter



Last records show that between 31 March and 1 April 2016, the downed helicopter flew from "Kala" air base to "Zhdanovsk" with a stopover at "Kyurdamir" air base

The route and the specified targets on the secret flight map indicate that the crew was tasked to attack targets in the territory of NKR, at a depth of up to ten kilometers from the Line of Contact


On this combat map the crew is tasked to hit 9 designated targets at a depth of 3 to 10 kilometers.
LINE OF CONTACT
TARGETS

16-06930

In the area of Mount Lyalya Ilyagi, a grid is applied with the possible directions of aviation spotters' work with a group of army aviation helicopters



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S/2016/389